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ABSTRACT: Lignite mine and power plant can operate as two separate entities, two entities in one 
holding or joint venture and as the one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has
the influence on operation of this tandem including realization of its individual and joint objectives, price 
negotiation, transactional costs, irreversible investments (sunk costs), different access to information
(asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic behaviour and other threats,
which can be used against the second side. An attempt has been made to show these problems from the
point of view of economic effectiveness based on a bilateral monopoly (BM) model and game theory
approach with usage of pit optimisation methods. Advantages and disadvantages of different solutions 
have been presented as well as rational incentives to vertical integration due to inherent conflict of
individual and group rationality in BM. This conflict of interest can lead to Pareto sub optimal solution in
case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to waste of
potential profit and decrease of mineable reserves  - excavation of smaller pit, which is optimal only to
the mine but not to the whole BM. 
1 ORGANIZATIONAL AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY 
 
Lignite mines and power plants can operate as: 
I. two separate entities (having the same or different owners),  
II. two entities operating in one holding (with joint owner) or as a joint venture and  
III. the one vertically integrated energy producer.  
We can find in Poland, now or in the past, examples of almost all listed solutions. In the first category 
there used to be pairs of separate firms: lignite mines and power plants having the same owner – the state 
treasure. Lignite prices in the past were regulated or confirmed by the President of The Energy 
Regulatory Office, so the freedom of economic decisions was restricted (Jurdziak, 2005a). Now after 
freeing of lignite prices (since the 1st of January 2003) still exists two pairs of separate entities, which 
belong to different owners (to a certain extent). There are KWB “Adamow “ SA and KWB “Konin” SA 
(owned in 100% by the state treasure) and ZE PAK SA which is owned (in 41.8%) by private investor, 
employees (8.2%) and the state treasure (50%). Two left pairs of mine and power plant are a part of the 
state owned holding BOT “Gornictwo i energetyka” SA created on the 9th of March 2004 which has 69% 
shares in mines and power plants “Belchatow” and “Turow” and one power plant “Opole” (burning hard 
coal). According to Polish law such holding structure implicates that mines and power plants are 
associated enterprises what put additional obligation on such entities regarding selecting and reporting of 
transfer prices (inter-company pricing) in transaction between them (Jurdziak, 2006c). There is not any 
example of the vertically integrated lignite based energy producer in Poland but the RWE Rheinbraun 
from Germany can be a good example. In this firm integration of mines and power plants is so close that 
management resigned from lignite price at all and treats the mine as a cost centre in the value chain of 
energy production. It will be shown that such solution restricts optimisation of the mine and the whole 
BM. 
Since the 1.01.2003 lignite prices can be freely negotiated between power plants and mines (Jurdziak, 
2005a). This new situation should open the area of research and analysis of BM operation and the role of 
lignite price in relation of both sides on a free market. Freeing of lignite prices is a part of electric energy 
market liberalization plan and has created the new situation for several entities on this market. In Poland 
about 40% of electric energy is produced from burning lignite so it is important to analyze this new 
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situation. It is especially important due to several decisions dealing with privatisation and reorganization 
is taken before any economic analysis is done or model created in order to find out the best solution.  
2 INHERENT CONFLICT OF INDYWIDUAL AND GROUP RATIONALITY 
2.1 Negotiation in bilateral monopoly as a game 
The lignite price negotiation between mine-mouth power plant and opencast lignite mine can be treated as 
a bargaining game. Due to an optimal adjustment of shape and size of the ultimate pit to economic 
conditions on the electric energy market (e.g. prices of electricity) and costs in both firms can improve 
joint profits of BM (Jurdziak 2004a,b) the game is non-zero sum. Cooperation between both sides of BM 
influences the level of payoffs and it is worth to reach an agreement. Therefore it has been proposed to 
treat this negotiation as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game (Jurdziak, 2006a, b). In 
the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be selected and in the second one the 
split of profit ought to be decided together with calculation of the transfer price of lignite. In the mine two 
lignite prices would exists: the optimal price for which the optimal ultimate pit is selected and which is 
used for economic evaluation of mining activity effectiveness and the transfer price used for mutual 
clearing of accounts between both sides – the division of maximal profits according to agreed proportions 
of shares between both sides. 
2.2 Asymmetry of information and the predominant strategy of lignite mine 
In BM of a mine and a power plant this is the mine, which has the information advantage over the power 
plant. This advantage results from the knowledge of the lignite deposit. The mine knows the quality of 
lignite in the area of planned excavation and can forecast its cost based on data about the shape and size 
of the deposit as well as the amount of overburden and lignite. Of course this knowledge is only estimated 
due to the discrete identification of deposit features. Nevertheless the mine has this knowledge and the 
power plant not. This knowledge alone does not create any advantage especially in short term. At best it 
can be used as an excuse for difficulties with meeting agreed targets (regarding time, amount and quality 
of supplied lignite).  
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Figure 1. The long run lignite supply from the mine to power plant – the relation between lignite price (presented as a 
part of the reference price in %) and the optimal ultimate pit maximising non-discounted net cash flows (presented as 
the amount of lignite inside pit) for 34 nested pits generated for the “Szczercow” deposit. 
 
However in the long run the mine can for each lignite price find out the best ultimate pit maximising the 
net, non-discounted cash flows using Lerchs-Grossmann optimisation technique (Fig.1).  
In the alternative approach L-G ultimate pits can be replaced by the set of optimal schedules within 
optimal pits generated in optimisation software (e.g. NPVScheduler). Even though this approach is better 
because of usage of discounted values and schedules but it is much more complicated due to the scale of 
detail planning connected with generation of optimal excavation schedules for several lignite prices.  
The possibility of the optimal adjustment of shape and size of the left for excavation part of the deposit 
creates the predominant strategy for the mine. The power plant decreasing the lignite price during 
negotiation never knows if the mine optimally adjusting to it does not resign from the excavation of the 
current pit in aid of excavating the smaller one but bringing more profit (due to its optimality) than the 
previous pit with smaller price. Due to the changes are not linear sometimes the small decrease of lignite 
price can lead to big difference in size and shape of the pit (Fig. 1). In consequence instead of expected 
increase of the power plant profit both the mine and the power plant can have lower profits.  
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Figure 2. Split of profit in BM for 34 nested pits from the “Szczercow” deposit. 
 
For each of nested pits it can be found two lignite prices: piE and piK for which the mine and the power 
plant (respectively) attain break-even points (their revenues cover costs). There is also the lignite price pi, 
which maximises net value of this pit ΠiK in comparison to profits of the rest of nested pits. Such price 
exists due to this pit is one of nested pits generated in parameterization process and it is therefore the 
optimal for the given price. This price, which can be called border price, is the lowest lignite price for 
which this pit offers the highest profit ΠiK. If the next border price p(i+1) for the next pit (i+1, a greater 
one) is lower then piK then for the prices from interval [p(i+1), piK] it is better for the mine to excavate one 
of next pits. For prices from border prices interval [pi, p(i+1)] profit of the mine is linearly increasing from 
ΠiK and the pit i is the best (gives the highest net cash flow from other pits). For the border price p(i+1) the 
net cash flows Π(i+1)K is greater and it is better for the mine to excavate the next pit (i+1) than the previous 
one. 
The existence of the predominant strategy of the mine means that it can dynamically adjust the ultimate 
pit (or the schedule in the alternative solution) to the negotiated price.  
2.3 Dynamic adjustments of the shape and size of the ultimate pit as a real option 
In many lignite mines such dynamic adjustments of the shape and size of the ultimate pit (the schedule in 
the alternative approach) to the new conditions (the change of lignite price is only one of possible reasons 
of such action) is not at all considered. In such case the game is zero-sum, the interests of power plant and 
mine are completely opposed and there is no incentive for cooperation. It is worth to do everything what 
can be done (including threats, strikes, putting pressure etc.) to increase (for the mine) or to decrease (for 
the power plant) the lignite price if the mine is going to excavate the one and only ultimate pit (or realise 
the one and only schedule). There are no reasons for such strenuously sticking to the only one solution. 
The value of the mine and, of course, the value of the whole BM can be increased by dynamic and elastic 
adjustment to changes in economic conditions. The real option valuation technique gives additional value 
for potential elasticity of management in changing their minds after new information come up and the 
economic environment changes. This is exactly the case. It is worth to re-optimise the pit (prepare the 
new optimal schedule) if the mine gets more information about the deposit or the economic conditions 
change e.g. lignite price is lowered. Modern 3D software make this process much more easy and not so 
expensive as traditional manual and only 2D designs. 
The mine having possibility of elastic adjustments to new lignite prices has the information advantage 
over the power plant and can use the predominant strategy of the optimal adjustment to the new situation.  
2.4 Lignite price contours 
The joint BM profits for the particular pit (being the sum of power plant and mine profits) is constant and 
does not depend of lignite price (ΠiK(p)+ΠiE(p)=ΠiV(p)=const). The mine profit ΠiK(p) for the lignite 
price p from the break-even prices interval (piE, piK) increases from 0 up to ΠiV and the power plant profit 
decreases from ΠiV down to 0. This means that on lines x+y=ΠiV=const in the positive quarter of 
coordinate system we can place lignite prices starting from piE up to piK in intervals proportional to the 
quotient (piK- piE)/SQRT(2ΠiV2). It is enough therefore to find out break-even prices for each of nested 
pits (Jurdziak, 2004a, b).  
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Figure 3. Usage of lignite price contours in profit division in BM and demonstration of the inherent contradiction  
of individual and group rationality. Lignite contours are drawn every 2%. 
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where cK(xi) is the total cost of excavating the pit i having xi amount of lignite, pe is the expected future 
price of electric energy, e(xi) is the amount of electric energy produced from xi amount of lignite, cE(xi) is 
the total cost of energy production form supplied lignite. 
The maximal joint profit which can be attained in BM in given economic conditions from excavation of 
the optimal ultimate pit is equal ΠVmax = max{ΠiV}. Profits from this and other pits and shares of these 
profits falling to the power plant ΠiE(p) and the mine ΠiK(p) for different lignite prices p on Figure 3 are 
expressed as the percent of maximal profits ΠVmax. Similarly the lignite price is expressed as a percent of 
the break-even lignite price for the power plant piK. This price due to the simplified assumption regarding 
direct proportionality of the lignite productivity e(xi) and total power plant costs cE(xi) from the amount of 
lignite xi is stable piK=const=pK. It has been also assumed that the break-even lignite price piE for the mine 
changes from 65% up to 90% of pK - 90% for the optimal ultimate pit, and 65% for the smallest pit. It is 
assumed that for each number from 0 up to ΠVmax it can be found the optimal ultimate pit bringing exactly 
this profit. Such assumptions are arbitrary and can be far from the real situation. Usually number of 
nested pits is restricted (in the “Szczercow” case it was 34 pits) and the profit and break-even prices 
changes are not linear (Fig.1). However it is used only to demonstrate the influence of pit selection on 
joint profits and the negotiated price on split of profit. It also illustrates growing incentive to opportunism 
with the increase of difference between the optimal and the negotiated price (Fig.3).  
2.5 Incentive to opportunism 
Suppose that the actually excavated pit is not optimal and gives only 91% of the maximal profit and the 
negotiated earlier price (92%pK) determines status quo point S. In such situation the mine has two 
solutions. Preferring cooperation it can select the pit optimal for the BM (giving 100% of ΠVmax profit) 
and calculate the new transfer price for the Nash solution (point O), which will be a bit higher (about 
1.8% pK) what improves its share of profit from 31% up to 36%. The power plant share of profit also 
increases from 60% to 64% (the movement from point S to O, Fig.3). Alternatively, behaving 
opportunistically (e.g. if there is no cooperation), the mine can select the variant optimal only for itself 
(excavation of the smaller pit - the movement from point S to K, Fig.3). The choice of the predominant 
strategy means the increase of its shares of the long-term profit from 31% up to 38%. Unfortunately for 
the power plant it means decrease of profit from 60% down to only 35%. The excavated pit would 
generate joint profits on the much lower level, which equals only 73% of the maximal profit (BM would 
loss 18% of potential profits). The mine opportunism could be even not noticed due to both the actual 
lignite price and contracted annual amount of lignite is not changed. Only the ultimate pit is different so 
the changes would be seen only in long run as the shorter period of pit excavation, what can be explained 
by more difficult geological conditions than expected before.  
The difference between profits attained by the mine selecting the Nash bargaining solution (point O) and 
choosing the predominant strategy (point X) creates the incentive to opportunistic behaviour (Fig.3). This 
incentive decreases with the increase of the lignite price approaching the optimal lignite price (movement 
of point O in direction of point E). In the “Szczercow” case the egalitarian solution (equal split of profits) 
lies on the new contract curve – optimal and egalitarian points are close to each other (Fig.2). It is 
therefore necessary to check for each deposit and each set of economic conditions how big is the inherent 
conflict of individual and group rationality in order to reduce it and prevent opportunistic behaviour 
through the appropriate transfer price selection. 
3 EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT BM STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP SOLUTIONS 
Analysis of different BM organizational and ownership structures (Tab.1) leads to conclusion that 
because of the inherent conflict of individual and group rationality only the full vertical integration of the 
lignite mine and the power plant can secure realisation of the optimal solution – excavation of the optimal 
ultimate pit maximising joint BM profits. In any other structure the incentive to opportunism can appear. 
It magnifies with the increase of the difference between the optimal lignite price and the price established 
during negotiation. It is therefore important for the power plant to know the optimal price and to have 
equal access to all necessary information. Asymmetry of information also leads to opportunism.  
Two different owners of BM sides having opposed interests increase the threats of non-cooperative 
behaviours and realisation of the solution, which is not optimal in Pareto sense. 
The difference between optimal and suboptimal profits ΠVmax-ΠVsub creates a premium for elastic 
adjustment to new conditions (e.g. new information about the deposit or better forecasts of the future 
electricity demand). It can be treated and valued as the real option to change the scale of BM operation. 
Integration of lignite mines and power plants does not create any threats to electric energy market and 
energy consumers due to the pit optimal for BM is greater than the pit optimal only for the mine and the 
energy supply increases. There will be also other positive synergy effects for consumers (e.g. decrease of 
transactional costs) increasing economic effectiveness of the integrated energy producer (Jurdziak, 
2005b). 
Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of different BM structure and ownership solutions (Jurdziak, 2005c). 
 A State owned BM 
B 
Competing BM 
C 
Bilateral Holding 
D 
Integrated energy 
producer 
Ownership : 1 owner e.g. State Treasure 2 different owners 1 owner 1 owner 
Structure: 2 firms in BM 2 firms in BM Holding of firms, 2 profit centres  
1 firm, 
2 cost centres 
Accounting: separate Separate separate common 
Price of electric 
energy: Regulated, long term Market Market Market 
Lignite price: 
Regulated or 
confirmed by 
President of URE  
Freely negotiated Agreed transfer price 
Lack of 
e.g. in Rheinbraun 
or the optimal price 
Objectives of BM 
sides: 
Management or trade 
unions objectives 
realisation  
Profit maximisation Profit maximisation  Cost minimisation 
Common 
objectives: 
Government 
objectives realisation Doubtful 
Owner’s profit 
maximisation 
Owner’s profit 
maximisation 
Transactional 
costs: High Very high High Low 
Information: 
Information 
asymmetry, access 
possible 
Information 
asymmetry, access 
strictly controlled 
Equal access within 
agreed procedures  
Full and equal access 
to information 
Possibility of 
opportunistic 
behaviour: 
YES YES, very high 
Yes but restricted by 
the holding 
management 
Small – e.g. through 
excessive costs  
Advantages: 
Possibility of activity 
coordination on the 
country basis 
Local effectiveness Big capitalization  
Common objectives, 
effectiveness econ. 
big capitalization 
Disadvantages: 
State ownership,  
manual control, 
lack of effectiveness 
Conflict of interests, 
rivalry instead of 
cooperation 
Conflict of interests, 
bureaucracy 
Elimination of lignite 
price creates problems 
with economic 
evaluation of mine 
Threats: Group interests domination 
Suboptimal solutions 
realisation 
Possibility of 
suboptimal solutions 
realisation 
Difficulties in BM and 
mine development 
optimisation 
Examples: Mines and power plants before 2003r. 
KWB Konin S.A.  
& ZE PAK SA 
BOT „Gornictwo i 
Energetyka” S.A. RWE Rheinbraun 
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